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Of Lollipops and Law - A Proposal
for a National Policy Concerning
Tender Offer Defenses
Ted J. Fiflis*
Early last year, Mesa Petroleum Company made a tender offer for
shares of Unocal Corporation in an effort to take over Unocal. Unocal
responded by using the "lollipop" defense, which is a discriminatory is-
suer self-tender offer. Unocal's use of this defense resulted in huge eco-
nomic losses to many of Unocal's small shareholders who were not knowl-
edgeable about the ramifications of their participation or non-
participation in the tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld
Unocal's use of this defense as an appropriate exercise of business judg-
ment. A federal district court in California refused to strike down the
lollipop under federal law because it was exclusively a state law ques-
tion. In this Article, Professor Fiflis argues that broad federal legislation
is needed to limit possible abuses of the lollipop and similar tender offer
defenses.
INTRODUCTION
In spring 1985, Unocal Corporation made a self-tender offer for its
own shares in a successful effort to defeat a hostile "two-tier, front-end-
loaded," tender offer by Mesa Petroleum.' The secret to Unocal's vic-
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. B.S. 1954, Northwestern
University; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University. I wish to express my appreciation for the
assistance of Ms. Patricia Kent, a third-year student at the University of Colorado Law
School, and to my colleague, Professor Mark Loewenstein, for his helpful comments.
References herein shall be to sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 instead
of to the United States Code.
For a description, see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) [hereafter Unocal (Del.)]; Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) [hereafter Unocal (Fed.)]. A "two-tier, front-end loaded" bid typically-is a
cash tender offer for a portion of the shares, usually in an amount sufficient to give the
bidder control, to be followed by a freeze-out merger of the target with a subsidiary of
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tory was its discriminatory exclusion of Mesa from the offer.
Unlike many currently popular tender offer defenses, the Unocal de-
fense may operate successfully not only against two-tier, front-end-
loaded bids, but also against partial bids without the second tier
merger. In either of these circumstances, the issuer may offer to buy
some or all of the shares not bid for by the hostile party. The crucial
feature is that the issuer's offering price must be too high for the bidder
to afford, yet not too high for the issuer. To illustrate, in simplest
terms, and excluding many complicating factors of judgment: A hostile
bidder deems the target worth no more than $80 per share. It offers to
buy fifty-one percent of the target for $85 per share with the expecta-
tion of paying no more than $74.79 per share for the remaining forty-
nine percent in a second stage acquisition, for a blended price of $80.
Under these circumstances, the issuer might offer up to $80 for the
forty-nine percent if it has estimated value in the same amount as the
bidder. Since the bidder cannot pay more than $74.79 for the forty-nine
percent after completing the first tier, the issuer presumably will suc-
ceed in its bid. In that case, if the bidder accepted the fifty-one percent,
it would end up owning one hundred percent (as its shares become the
only ones outstanding) at a cost of $85 per share for the partially de-
pleted company. Since the shares are worth only $80, the bidder pre-
sumably will withdraw, leaving the issuer, if it proceeds with its self-
tender, with a smaller company (unless the consideration is debt, which
will leave the company with a higher debt-equity ratio). Thus, the is-
suer will have incurred an acceptable cost of only $80 per share. Of
course, it is also possible that after the hostile bidder withdraws, the
issuer may do the same. However, this mutual withdrawal is not likely
to occur because the issuer's management will foresee the impact on its
the bidder, in a "triangular merger" (i.e., one involving a subsidiary of the bidder), the
merger price to be received being less than that received on the front-end tender offer.
The two-tier feature is said to be coercive because shareholders are induced strongly
to tender at the higher first step price in order to avoid being squeezed out at the lower
price in the second stage. Thus, even shareholders who would have preferred to remain
shareholders of the firm will sell. Another effect is that sophisticated speculators and
insiders are more likely to tender in the first stage than are small, unsophisticated ones.
See infra text accompanying note 10.
The first stage of the technique has striking parallels to the cases involving sale of
control by a single shareholder or group of shareholders for a control premium. See,
e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
Courts have generally permitted the sale of control at a premium despite theoreticians'
views that the premium belongs to the corporation or all the shareholders. This concept
is now being invoked in "equal price" statutes (without attribution, one may add). The
debate has been one of the longest-run, unresolved questions of corporate law.
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shareholders, who would be unlikely to support management
thereafter.
This type of discriminatory issuer self-tender offer, which has been
dubbed a "lollipop," 2 was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court' as
within the Unocal directors' business judgment. The hostile bidder was,
in the court's view, either seeking "greenmail," 4 which the court ruled
the directors were entitled to prevent, or planning to issue "junk
bonds"'5 for acquisition of the remaining forty-nine percent, which the
Unocal directors were entitled to replace with higher quality Unocal
debt." In a separate federal court proceeding in the Central District of
California, Judge Tashima also refused to invalidate the Unocal lolli-
pop under federal law because it was exclusively a question of state
law. Judge Tashima held that "Congress never intended to substan-
tively regulate tender offers."
'7
' See Suckered by the "Lollipop" Ploy, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 25, col. 1
(letter to editor from T. Boone Pickens, Jr.)[hereafter Pickens letter]; Cohen, More
Firms Using "Lollipop" Tactics to Fight Takeovers, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 3,
col. 4.
a Unocal (Del.), 493 A.2d 946.
"Greenmail" is a premium payment by a target to the bidder for its target shares
and a covenant not to do it again.
5 "Junk bonds" are high-risk, high-yield debt instruments. In the takeover situation,
the typical arrangement is for an investment banker to call upon a stable of speculative
investors for commitments to buy the bonds from the bidder for a fee, with the expecta-
tion that the takeover may or may not eventuate. If it does not, the committors have
earned a fee without more. If the takeover is consummated, the expectation is that the
merged companies will assume the debt.
For a comprehensive study of junk bonds, especially as they relate to takeovers, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE USE OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, THE ROLE OF HIGH YIELD BONDS [JUNK BONDS] IN CAP-
ITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 99-W (Comm. Print 99-W 1985).
Mesa's president, T. Boone Pickens, has asserted that neither he nor Unocal ever
contemplated that Mesa should receive greenmail. See The World According to Pick-
ens, BARRON'S, Sept. 23, 1985, at 8, 9.
The issue of precisely when directors have license to oppose a hostile bid in their
business judgment, or to mount prebid defenses, is not likely to be settled in a manner
that will avoid the need for case-by-case adjudication. Compare, e.g., Unocal (Del.)
with MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. 1985)
(business judgment rule did not prevent avoidance by the court of the target's defense).
This Article, however, is concerned with federal law only.
' Unocal (Del.), 493 A.2d at 956-57.
' Unocal (Fed.), 608 F. Supp. at 1082. The court also stated that "state courts [have
the jurisdiction] to deal with substantive issues of corporation law and corporate gov-
19861
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The result, according to Mesa's president, was that the Unocal
shareholders who tendered to Unocal received a blended value of $43
when, without the Unocal self-tender, all shareholders would have re-
ceived a blended value of $54 per share from Mesa." Perhaps more
disturbing are the additional consequences: Unocal insiders received the
$72 front-end price for a portion of their shares, and Mesa received the
$72 for a portion of its holdings when it settled as defeat became appar-
ent. The holders of twenty million Unocal shares, who never tendered
their shares, wound up with shares valued at $29.' Mesa's president
later stated the obvious: "These shares were presumably owned by
small, unsophisticated shareholders who were not adequately informed
about the consequences of not participating in the exchange. As a re-
sult, these shareholders lost $300 million. Unocal's directors and of-
ficers, on the other hand, were able to . . .receive a portion of the
$300 million these shareholders left on the table.""0 One might add: "as
was Mesa."11
One may properly ask whether it is appropriate for Delaware, which
conceivably may not be the abode of a single Unocal shareholder, to fix
national policy in an international securities market, while Congress
and the federal courts, Nero-like, abdicate a policymaking role. Indeed,
if the reputed actualities of Delaware lawmaking are taken into ac-
count, 2 the question is: is it appropriate for perhaps four or five law-
yers in Delaware to fix that national public policy?
The question is not limited to the lollipop defense to takeovers. It
applies to most defenses because the law of the target's state of incorpo-
ration, not federal law, regulates the validity of defenses.1  The only
ernance, including issues of the fairness in a corporation's treatment of its sharehold-
ers." Id. at 1083.
8 See Pickens letter, supra note 2.
9Id.
10 Id.
"a Lollipops need not take the simple form of the Unocal discriminatory tender offer.
They would include any discriminatory offers, such as "poison pills," which give cer-
tain rights to all but the shares of a hostile bidder; these rights hinder the hostile bid by
increasing its costs. See infra note 20. For example, Revlon, early in the takeover by
Pantry Pride, issued rights to its holders other than Pantry Pride to allow them to sell
their shares back to the company at a premium. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. 1985).
"' See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation
Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
'" See Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707, 719 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984), in
which the court felt compelled to scold counsel for forgetting that the usual choice-of-
[Vol. 19:303
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defenses clearly governed by federal law are those involving a target's
disclosure failings.1 4 In most states, this means that management may
raise defenses, without shareholder consent, in the exercise of its "busi-
ness judgment.'
'1 5
As we shall see, the SEC's position, contrary to Judge Tashima's
view, is that the lollipop defense is unlawful under existing federal law,
and the Commission is currently proposing an explicit rule to outlaw
the defense. 6 The question of whether the SEC is correct may be
law rule selects the law of the state of incorporation to regulate internal affairs. The
choice of law of the state of incorporation to regulate target management defenses is not
constitutionally compelled by the due process, impairment, or full faith and credit
clauses. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 433 (1968); Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955); see
also discussion in Norlin v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984). Of course,
the Commerce Clause may prohibit a state from adopting tender offer legislation that
may unduly burden commerce. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
Also, due process prohibits a state with no relevant interests from regulating any per-
son. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
" See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
'o See, e.g., Unocal (Del.), 493 A.2d 946; see also Moran v. Household Int'l, 500
A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985):
Other jurisdictions have also applied the business judgment rule to ac-
tions by which target companies have sought to forestall takeover activity
they considered undesirable. See Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith Inter-
national, 5th Cir., 741 F.2d 707 (1984) (sale of discounted subordinate
debentures containing springing warrants); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lin-
coln Savings and Loan, 7th Cir., 749 F.2d 374 (1984) (amendment to by-
laws); Panter v. Marshall Field, 7th Cir., 646 F.2d 271 (1981) (acquisi-
tions to create antitrust problems); Johnson v. Trueblood, 3d Cir., 629
F.2d 287 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981) (refusal to tender);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 2d Cir., 634 F.2d 690 (1980) (sale
of stock to favored party); Treadway v. Care Corp., 2d Cir., 638 F.2d 357
(1980) (sale to White Knight); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates, E.D.
Pa., 600 F. Supp. 678 (1985) (standstill agreement;); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ogden .Corp., W.D.N.Y., 555 F. Supp. 892, affd (2d Cir.), 717 F.2d
757, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983) (sale of treasury shares and grant
of stock option to White Knight); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, N.D. Ill.,
535 F. Supp. 933 (1982) (disposal of valuable assets); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., D. Md., 549 F. Supp. 623 (1982) (Pac-Man de-
fense) (only partial citations included).
When management's self-interest is implicated, the standard is altered. Id.
" SEC Rel. No. 33-6596 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,798 (July 1, 1985) (proposing amendments to Rule 13e-4). The Commission, in
Release 33-6595 (July 1, 1985), concurrently proposed Rule 14d-10, among other
things, to require third party tender offers to be made to all holders. SEC Rel. No. 33-
6596 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,797.
1986]
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mooted before publication of this Article if the SEC decides not to
adopt its proposal, or if a court, after adoption, upholds or strikes down
the rule.1 Nevertheless, the lollipop is the vehicle of discussion here
because it is the subject of current interest. We shall see that the SEC
is probably wrong. However, even if courts uphold the proposed rule,
or if the rule stands unchallenged, state law will continue to regulate
exclusively numerous other target company defenses. Therefore, this
Article's subject will have continued relevance.
The lollipop defense illustrates vividly the problems arising in the
law governing tender offer defenses. The SEC and the federal courts
are generally impotent in regulating tender offer defenses under ex-
isting law. Thus, Congress must set national policy to replace state law.
This Article argues that when Congress assumes that responsibility, it
should not attempt to establish a comprehensive policy, but should leave
that task to the SEC and the federal courts. However, the states should
continue to regulate these defenses until the SEC fully formulates a
national policy.
The recommended legislation to achieve these goals is straightfor-
ward and simple. The only alteration necessary is to include in the
definition of the term "manipulative" as used in the tender offer anti-
fraud section (section 14(e) of the 1934 Act) "all cunning devices," as
defined by SEC rules, even if not based on misrepresentations or non-
disclosures. This definition is more in keeping with the generally un-
derstood meaning of the term and perhaps the original understanding
of Congress when it adopted the Williams Act in 1968, as this Article
later discusses. This legislation would validate the SEC's proposals con-
cerning lollipops. It also would legitimize several other questionable ex-
tant rules of the Commission."8 It would enable the Commission to act
on a case-by-case basis to consider whether to adopt rules concerning
two-tier deals, "lock-ups," '19 "poison pills,"' O "superstock," 1 and the
17 Some securities lawyers have expressed the view that the validity of the proposals,
if adopted, may go untested because issuers will not be willing to sue at the risk of
delaying defensive steps. See, e.g., oral remarks of Ralph Ferrara, former general coun-
sel of SEC, at 18th Annual Rocky Mountain State-Federal-Provincial Securities Con-
ference, Oct. 18, 1985. Harvey Pitt, another former general counsel of the Commission
who was present at the 'same meeting, seemed to concur.
18 For example, it has been suggested that after Schreiber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 28-30, rule 14e-
1, requiring all tender offers to remain open for 20 business days, may be invalid. See
Pitt & Cherno, Williams Act Rejected as Tool to Ensure Fairness, Legal Times, June
17, 1985, at 27.
" "Lockups" are of two varieties, each of which may take the form of either an
[Vol. 19:303
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like. Because the proposal would operate only if the SEC adopts a rule,
option or a grant. Under one, the target grants to a white knight (i.e., a friendly suitor
brought in by the target as a rival to the hostile bidder because it is believed that the
target will gain greater benefits) shares, or an option to purchase shares, of the target
sufficient to give it a high probability of success in a tender offer to defeat a hostile
bidder. The other is a grant or an option to buy valuable assets or a business line (the
"crown jewel") of the target, usually at a bargain price. Some would distinguish invul-
nerable lockups from vulnerable ones by terming ihe latter "leg-ups." But exactitude is
not suited to jargon; it would profit one little to pretend to such precision.
Two important recent decisions deal with the validity of lockup options. Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp. [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,376 (2d Cir.
1986) (independent directors had an enhanced duty of care when granting, in the face
of a hostile bid, a lockup option to assure a leveraged buyout in which management is
participating; failure to inquire as to bases for advice of counsel and financial advisers
is negligent when the possible effect of the lockup is to cut off bidding or otherwise
cause shareholders harm); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. [Cur-
rent Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,333 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd, Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,357 (Del. 1985) (lockup granted to one bidder to be tested by duty of loyalty once
directors have decided to auction the company in a bidding contest; duty of loyalty
applicable at least when management is partially motivated by concern for its own
liability and when the lockup precludes further bidding).
For the ultimate invulnerable lockup, see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983), described infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
20 "Poison pills" are various but are typified by the technique explained in Moran v.
Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The basic concept is that if the bidder
succeeds in its takeover, it will receive a company subject to liabilities that will make
the takeover fatal. For example, the target may provide that its shareholders will be
entitled to options to purchase shares of the surviving corporation (should a merger
occur) or of the target (after a takeover without a merger) for half price.
21 "Superstock" is a stock that has disproportionately high voting power in a format
that is undesirable to a bidder. For example, American Family holders voted in 1985 to
multiply all votes by 10, but required any subsequent shareholder to hold for four years
before becoming entitled to the extra nine votes per share.
The New York Stock Exchange ostensibly has a policy against disparate voting for
common stock. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL (CCH) §§ A-
30, A-31. It is reconsidering this policy because it has lost some listings recently and
may have to delist several companies which are now in violation. See INITIAL REPORT
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND QUALITATIVE LISTING
STANDARDS, DUAL CLASS CAPITALIZATION, Jan. 3, 1985. Since SEC approval of
stock exchange rules is required (see § 19(b) of the 1934 Act), the Commission has used
its power to prod the exchange to reconsider its reconsideration; but to avoid unfair
competition the Commission has urged the other exchanges and the NASD to agree to
identical policies. Congress is waiting in the wings. Presumably the problem will be
resolved sometime in 1986.
Interestingly, no one seems to question the propriety of federal law being applied in
this context to a tender offer defense. Perhaps that is because most observers do not
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the statute would preserve the states as the primary lawmakers until
and unless the SEC acts. Further, a more visible federal forum would
exist for making tender offer policy, in contrast to the murky proce-
dures now followed in many state capitols."' Finally, the proposed leg-
islation would enhance flexibility; the SEC could act more quickly than
Congress, congressional oversight would provide a constraint on radical
actions, and rulemaking procedures would assure due process. Each of
these felicitous results appear more desirable than the current state of
affairs.
I. THE PRESENT IMPOTENCY OF THE SEC AND THE FEDERAL
COURTS REGARDING TENDER OFFER DEFENSES - A CASE
HISTORY
The lollipop has been touted as an extremely powerful defense to
hostile two-tier and partial bids since the Unocal battle, to the great
discomfort of the SEC. The Commission was dissuaded from interven-
ing in the California federal court case, probably because it was in a
vulnerable strategic position."3 Subsequently, however, it published a
proposal to outlaw lollipops by requiring self-tender offers to be made
to all holders of the class of security being sought.2 4 It also published
another proposed rule to apply the same "all holders" rule to third
party bids." In its two releases, the Commission asserted that the lolli-
pop, and any other discriminatory bid, always has been unlawful even
without the proposed rules. The Commission contends that the Wil-
liams Act contains "an implicit requirement for equal treatment of se-
curity holders" under both section 14(d), regulating offers by third par-
ties,2" and section 13(e), regulating issuers' securities acquisitions
believe that federal law is applied when a stock exchange enacts a rule, although those
rules are subject to SEC approval or even initiation. That belief seems incorrect.
22 Most securities lawyers are well aware that much takeover legislation is lobbied
through by one or a very few companies in any particular state and that state legisla-
tors have in mind only the immediate local interest of those companies.
S See Victor, Unocal: Questions Remain, Legal Times, June 3, 1985, at 1. The
article explains that both sides had lobbied the SEC heavily in Unocal concerning in-
tervention and that three factors were important in its decision not to intervene: (a)
each side was well-represented; (b) the Commission had earlier proposed but failed to
adopt an all-holders rule; and (c) Mesa's hands were somewhat soiled in the view of
Judge Tashima, who had earlier found failures to disclose and active concealment with
respect to § 13(d) filings concerning Mesa's intentions to seek control of Unocal.
"' See supra note 16.
:5 Id.
' See [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 87,560. The Williams Act, 82
[Vol. 19:303
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including tender offers.27 These provisions thus prohibit offers not
made to all holders of any class of securities for which an offer is made.
The releases do not point to explicit language or articulated policies of
the Act to establish this all holders rule, and it is difficult to find any in
the text of the statute.
Given the potency of lollipops, the two Unocal court decisions, and
the SEC's all holders rule proposals, it is necessary to consider two
questions: (1) whether the lollipop is now illegal under federal law, as
the Commission claims, contrary to Judge Tashima's opinion, and (2)
whether the Commission's proposed rules would be valid if adopted.
This Article's conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that the Com-
mission is correct on either score.
A. The Schreiber Opinion
Last term, in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,2 the Supreme
Court held that in the absence of misrepresentation or nondisclosure,
there is no "manipulative" act in connection with a tender offer and
therefore no transgression of section 14(e) of the Williams Act."9 Thus
Stat. 455, was originally codified in 1968 as §§ 13(d), (e) and 14(d), (e), (f) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
" See [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 87,570. Section 13(e), the rules-
enabling act for all issuer repurchases, reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity securities
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or which is a closed-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, to purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchase is in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define
acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and
(B) to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and prac-
tices. Such rules and regulations may require such issuer to provide hold-
ers of equity securities of such class with such information relating to the
reasons for such purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be
purchased, the price to be paid for such securities, the method of purchase,
and such additional information, as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, or
which the Commission deems to be material to a determination whether
such security should be sold.
s 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
i Section 14(e), a general antifraud provision concerning tender offers, reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
1986]
University of California, Davis
nondeceptive tender offers or defenses thereto, even if unfair, are not
subject to section 14(e). Perhaps more importantly, the Court made
clear that the grant to the SEC of rulemaking power in the last sen-
tence of section 14(e) is also limited to regulation of manipulative acts
involving only misrepresentation or nondisclosure, including prophylac-
tic measures, only if designed to prevent deception or nondisclosure.
This appears from the Court's statement that the Commission has "lat-
itude to regulate nondeceptive activities" but only "as a 'reasonably
designed' means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting
any change in the meaning of the term 'manipulative' itself.""0
Thus, one significant effect of Schreiber is to throw into question the
prophylactic rules, such as rule 14e-1, adopted under section 14(e). The
significance of the potential invalidity of rule 14e-1 is far greater than
may at first meet the eye. The rule requires all tender offers (even
those not involving offers regulated by sections 14(d) and 13(e) - that
is, offers by 1934 Act registrants, certain closed-end mutual funds and
insurance companies"1 ) to remain open for a minimum of twenty days
after the offer commences. Therefore, many state statutes that conflict
with this requirement may be preempted, as, for example, was the
Michigan takeover statute."2 Obviously, however, if 14e-1 is invalid, it
can have no preemptive effect.
Schreiber was an easy case in which the Supreme Court resolved the
most important tender offer law problem of the term, if not the decade,
although, as Harold Bloomenthal points out, the case itself did not pose
the problem.33 Schreiber marks the completion of a trilogy of Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the term "manipulative" in the antifraud
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or re-
quest or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regula-
tions define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.
It is not absolutely clear whether a negligent nondisclosure or misrepresentation may be
a manipulation under § 14(e), but Schreiber, in the light of the Court's opinions involv-
ing § 10(b) of the same act, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), would seem to preclude liability for negligent
nondisclosure or misrepresentation.
so 105 S. Ct. at 2458 n.11.
:1 Insurance companies are regulated only by § 14(e), not § 13(e).
2 L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,271
(6th Cir. 1985).
33 Bloomenthal, RICO, Pari Delicto, Deception, and the Supreme Court, 7 SEC.
AND FED. CORP. L. REP. 49, 53-55 (1985).
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provisions of the 1934 Act.
The first of the cases, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,3" held that sci-
enter is necessary for both deceptions and manipulations under rule
10b-5."3 The Court also referred to the term "manipulative" in section
10(b), stating first it is "virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities." 6 The Court took this definition of
"manipulative" from the second edition of Webster's International Dic-
tionary, published in 1934. 3 The purpose of the Court's statement was
to substantiate its holding that- negligent conduct was not included. It
did not define manipulations beyond requiring scienter. Moreover, the
Court not only spoke of deception, but also included an alternative de-
sign to "defraud," a concept that could well have included nondeceptive
acts.38
The Court described the legislative history of the section as "bereft of
any explicit explanation of Congress' intent." 9 It then relied on the
legislative history of section 10(b) to show that it was by no means
clear that Congress intended to require misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure for a manipulation.'0 The Court noted that an early draft of the
section would have allowed the SEC to outlaw the use of "any device
or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner
which the Commission may by its rules and regulations find detrimen-
tal to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors. "41
3' 425 U.S. 186 (1976).
SB Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
se 425 U.S. at 199.
37 Id. at 199 n.21.
" For example, see some of the early cases under rule 10b-5 that were cited and
overruled in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), discussed infra notes 46-
48 and accompanying text.
" 425 U.S. at 201.
40 Id. at 201.
41 Id.
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Clearly this draft of the section was not intended to require deception.
However, the Court stated that this broad power was "abbreviated and
modified" in a later draft to make unlawful by statute "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance. '42 The Court, however, failed to describe
how Congress modified the prior draft. After pointing out that this his-
tory left the "intended scope of section 10(b)" unclear (still addressing
the issue of whether negligence was sufficient), the Court went on to
state:
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was to become § 10(b)
was by Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran
indicated:
"Subsection (c) (section 9(c) of H. R. 7852 - later section 10(b))
says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.'. . . . Of
course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative
devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause.
The Commission should have the authority to deal with new ma-
nipulative devices." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934).
This brief explanation of § 10(b) by a spokesman for its drafters is
significant. The section was described rightly as a "catchall" clause to en-
able the Commission "to deal with new manipulative [or cunning]
devices.""'
Thus, it seems the Hochfelder Court's view was that the only legisla-
tive history in point indicated that Congress purposefully left the term
"manipulative," although a "term of art," undefined. This, the Court
concluded, was to give the SEC flexibility in drafting rules to proscribe
new and artful or "cunning" devices, albeit excluding those lacking in
scienter. But if "manipulative" meant cunning devices as a catchall cat-
egory, Hochfelder did not purport to limit them to a.small segment of
all cunning devices - those involving misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure. Clearly Hochfelder had left undecided any question of whether a
manipulation required deception or nondisclosure; all the legislative
history it cited was characterized to include a broad range of intentional
wrongdoing - perhaps including "cunning devices" not based on de-
ception but merely amounting to unfair use of power.
Hence, a shareholder might believe she had a claim for manipulation
if she knew about it but was powerless to prevent it. The fact that in
popular parlance many people speak of someone being "manipulated,"
42 Id. at 201-02.
48 Id. at 202-03.
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although not deceived, bolsters this conclusion." Manipulation includes
misuse of power, not just the use of misrepresentation or nondisclosure
- the oft-sought resources of those without power. Indeed, the Second
Circuit on a petition for rehearing in Green v. Santa Fe"6 saw no ob-
stacle in Hochfelder to a finding that manipulations may include
nondeceptive acts. But the Supreme Court in the second case of the
trilogy, Santa Fe,'6 reversed the Second Circuit, holding that a short-
form, cash-out merger forced upon minority shareholders by a parent
corporation at an unfair price was not a "manipulation" under rule
10b-5 when the parent had disclosed data as to the fairness of the price.
The Court assumed, as did the parties, that the exclusive remedy for
the unfair price was a dissenter's appraisal right under state law and
reasoned that the plaintiffs, having received full disclosure prior to the
time for exercise of their rights, had not been deceived in a way that
caused them loss.' The Court then recognized only the first part of the
Hochfelder dicta, which stated that "manipulative" was a term of art.
The Court found that "[t]he term refers generally to practices, such as
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mis-
4 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971) includes in its
definitions of "manipulate" the following:
1: to treat, work, or operate with the hands or by mechanical means: han-
dle or manage esp. with skill or dexterity. . . 2 a: to treat or manage
with the mind or intellect [nature may be so manipulated that mathemati-
cal laws may be applied to it - M.R. Cohen] [if we can only quantify
our material and [manipulate] it statistically - S.L. Payne] . . .b (1) : to
control the action or course of by management : utilize by controlling and
managing [providence has strangely manipulated events toward this end
- Agnes S. Turnbull] [wealth is manipulated much as it is in our society
- Abram Kardiner] [manipulating a situation to achieve certain advan-
tages -F.G. Hawley] (2) : to control, manage, or play upon by artful,
unfair, or insidious means esp. to one's own advantage [manipulated the
Indians for national purposes, involving them in successive wars - H.M.
Hyman] [knew how to [manipulate] his weaknesses - Mary Deasy] [be-
ing used and manipulated by the knowing men around him - New Re-
public] . ..
Clearly the word extends beyond misrepresentation and nondisclosure in nonlegal
contexts.
5 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), affd in part and re-
manded in part, Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Second Circuit
panel decided Green on Feb. 18, 1976, before Hochfelder was decided on Mar. 30,
1976. The Second Circuit, however, denied rehearing after Hochfelder, on June 30,
1976.
46 430 U.S. 462.
41 Id. at 474 n.14.
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lead investors by artificially affecting market activity" and that "non-
disclosure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative
scheme." '48 It then went on to determine that it did not believe that
Congress intended the present squeeze-out to be included in the term
"manipulative."
Thus, the Court had not yet held that misrepresentation or nondis-
closure was a necessary condition to a 10b-5 violation; it was merely a
usual incident. The Court seemed instead to hold that the unfair
squeeze-out was not of the same nature as the classic manipulations it
had described, most of which involved some element of deception. In
fact, the Court stated that by this decision it did no more than "adhere
to the position that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate trans-
actions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanage-
ment."'49 Here, the Court relied on the case that extended 10b-5 to its
farthest boundaries, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Lfe &
Casualty Co. 50 In Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion, which drew three
dissents, the Court also held that lOb-5 did not cover traditional state
law fiduciary breaches.
The Court was correct in not overstating its position, because some
classic manipulations do not require deceit. For example, a "corner" on
the market in which a manipulator controls the supply of a commodity
or security does not depend on misrepresentation; nor does a bear raid
51
whereby supply is artificially increased to depress prices. Of course,
secrecy or misrepresentation, as the Court said in Santa Fe, and as in
the case of any wrongdoing, usually accompanies these manipulations
and will facilitate success.
Santa Fe, to the credit of the opinion's author, Justice White,
avoided relying on Webster's Dictionary to define "manipulative."
However, Santa Fe also paid little heed to what Justice Powell in
Hochfelder described as "[tihe most relevant exposition" of section
10(b): its statement that "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning de-
vices." The Court also ignored the Hochfelder Court's characterization
of 10(b) as a catchall clause to enable the Commission to deal with new
manipulative or cunning devices.52
8 Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
4 Id. at 479.
- 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). However, the Santa Fe Court was also at pains to find a
deception in the Superintendent of Insurance case as well.
51 A bear raid is the sale of securities or a commodity in quantities and under cir-
cumstances designed to reduce the price because of the excessive supply forced on the
market.
"' Santa Fe, 430 U.S. 462, 468.
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The facial inconsistency between the "catchall" purpose and the
description of the term as one of art was not commented upon, perhaps
because it was unnoticed, or perhaps because artfulness was not in-
tended to connote a restricted list of classic manipulations. Nevertheless,
at no point did Santa Fe categorically compel nondisclosure or decep-
tion in order to establish a manipulation. This tension set the stage for
the Court to consider whether tender offer defenses not involving decep-
tion or nondisclosure might nevertheless "artificially [affect] market ac-
tivity" and hence be held manipulative under section 14(e).
Tender offer defenses inherently involve efforts by issuers' manage-
ments either to raise the cost of shares or the transaction costs to a
bidder or to inhibit or otherwise prevent purchases altogether. In the
lay sense, as Webster's Third Edition clearly shows, these are "manip-
ulations" of the securities market in the target's shares since to manipu-
late simply means to treat, work, or operate with the mind or intellect,
a meaning derived from the original meaning, which is treatment or
working by the hands."3 Indeed, congresspersons seeking to articulate
in a word the general character of defensive measures by target man-
agements could reasonably settle on "manipulation" as being most de-
scriptive even of those not including deception or nondisclosure. As the
above discussion demonstrates, the ultimate language of section 10(b)
may not have modified congressional intent.
Moreover, section 14(e), involving tender offers, clearly furthers poli-
cies different from section 10(b)." While section 14(e) resembles sec-
tion 10(b), it also resembles section 14(a) and the proxy rules thereun-
der, and closely resembles the terminology of section 15(c)(2). The
courts therefore were free to decide on the basis of logic and policy,
unconfined by legislative history, precedent, the policies behind rule
10b-5, or statutory language, whether manipulations in the tender offer
context could include nondeceptive acts.
The ensuing history is generally familiar to securities lawyers. The
issue was posed in the Mobil Oil hostile offer for Marathon Oil stock
when Marathon granted two lock-up options to U.S. Steel, one of
which involved Marathon's crown jewel, the Yates oil field. In a widely
discussed 5 opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that Marathon (but not U.S.
53 See supra note 44.
" See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984);
Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule l0b-5 Comparisons, 71
GEo. L.J. 1311 (1983).
56 See, e.g., Nelson, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. - The Decision and Its
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Steel) had manipulated the price of its stock in violation of section
14(e), despite the lack of deception or nondisclosure. 56 However, several
other courts of appeal soon thereafter refused to follow suit, reading the
Santa Fe 10b-5 opinion to require deception or nondisclosure under
section 14(e).
57
With the aid of prior decisions, Judge Sofaer, in the district court
opinion in the Data Probe case, which was reversed on appeal,58
viewed both lines of cases as failing adequately to consider the issues.
In the most thoughtful opinion on this issue to date, he held that ma-
nipulations under section 14(e) may include an unfair scheme, even ab-
sent deception, that effectively blocks the free choice of a target's share-
holders to accept or reject a hostile bid. The Second Circuit panel based
its reversal on considerations of federalism, later endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Schreiber.59
In Data Probe, in the face of a hostile bid, the target's management
had simply entered into a friendly merger agreement at $1.40 per
share. It also granted a lock-up option to the merger partner to
purchase shares equal to 200 percent of the number then outstanding at
$1.40 each, thereby assuring the partner at least two-thirds of all
shares. The partner's position was thus guaranteed regardless of
whether existing shareholders tendered all their shares to the hostile
bidder and regardless of how any shareholders other than the merger
partner voted for the proposed merger. The hostile bidder's offer was
$1.55 but, of course, was conditioned on the competing merger not be-
ing completed.
Judge Sofaer framed the issue as follows: whether the Williams Act
permits the management of a target company, without a shareholder
voice, unilaterally to thwart an ongoing tender offer by granting to one
contestant an option that effectively precludes further bids.6" He sug-
Implications for Future Tender Offers, 7 CORP. L. REV. 233 (1984); Profusek,
Tender Offer "Manipulation": Tactics and Strategies After Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J.
975 (1982).
" Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982).
67 Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Data Probe Acquisition
Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018
(1983).
Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984).
59 This Article's position is that federalism concerns required the affirmance of
judge Sofaer in Data Probe, not reversal. See infra part III.
60 568 F. Supp. at 1545. In the Pantry Pride takeover of Revlon, the Delaware court
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gested this as a more realistic statement of the issue than the typical
issue proposed by target lawyers: whether the Williams Act is more
than a disclosure statute."
He then discussed the legislative history of the Williams Act, which
he felt indicated a dual legislative purpose including not only full dis-
closure but also a fair opportunity for shareholders to use the disclo-
sures.62 Analyzing the Sixth Circuit's Marathon decision, he pointed
out the difference between market trading (the object of 10b-5) and
tender offer battles (the object of 14(e)) in order to suggest the possibil-
ity for different meanings of the term "manipulative" within each sec-
tion.6" But because of concern that the Marathon test of artificial im-
struck down under state law such an invulnerable lockup on the basis of what the court
characterized as a "component of the business judgment rule" - the duty of loyalty
when the directors were motivated in part by self-interest. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,222 (Del.
Ch.), affd, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. [Current Vol.] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,357 (Del. 1985). (This characterization must come as a
surprise to corporate lawyers who have generally believed that, if anything, the busi-
ness judgment rule is a component of the duty of care.)
The opinion attempts to draw a fine line between situations in which "there is only
one genuine bidder in the picture and there is a risk of losing his participation in a
fast-moving situation" (a valid lockup) and the Revlon situation in which the option is
granted after two bidders are in the picture. In the latter case, the court said, if self-
interest motivates the directors, the lockup is void. This line drawing is unsatisfactory
since in both cases the effect of the lockup is to avoid an auction. But the question of
the correctness of Revlon is beyond the scope of the subject matter of this Article.
In Data Probe, Inc. v. CRC Information Sys., No. 92138-1983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982), the court reached essentially the same conclusions as a matter of New York state
law as the chancellor had in Revlon under Delaware law.
See also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp. [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,376 (2d Cir. 1986), in which the court found that there is an enhanced
duty of care for directors in granting a lockup in a leveraged buyout involving manage-
ment when the directors by their actions risk causing loss of a better deal for sharehold-
ers. None of these state law cases is well articulated, and turmoil in subsequent deci-
sions may be confidently predicted. Indeed one gets the impression that the Delaware
court, at least, may be reacting out of fear of federal intervention, just as they did in the
sqeezeout cases. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). However,
once the pressure for federal intervention diminished, Delaware reverted to its old
ways. Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). This further evidences the
value of the position taken in this Article - that there is need for SEC rulemaking
pursuant to new enabling legislation.
01 568 F. Supp. at 1545.
82 Id. at 1545-47.
13 Id. at 1549, 1555. The market for corporate control, partially regulated by the
Williams Act, is distinct from the capital markets, which are impacted by regulation of
fiduciary duties generally. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
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pact on market prices might be too broad, Judge Sofaer stated he would
outlaw only options that "unduly interfere with the tender offer pro-
cess," thereby allowing defenses that encourage auctions but not those
that conclusively determine the contest, as in the Data Probe lock-up.
The judge left the line between these two categories to be drawn on a
case-by-case basis. Thus the grant of an option for perhaps fifteen to
twenty percent of the target may be acceptable because, in the best in-
terests of shareholders, it would encourage competitive bidding in an
auction for the target. On the other hand, the 200 percent option in
Data Probe would be invalid as preventing an auction.
On appeal the Second Circuit reversed because it believed Santa Fe
and Second Circuit decisions required deception for a manipulation
under section 14(e) and because, as stated in Part IV of Santa Fe,
breaches of fiduciary duty traditionally are for state courts. The Second
Circuit gave short shrift to Judge Sofaer's thoughtful views.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Data Probe, as it had in
Marathon, but accepted certiorari in the third case of the trilogy,
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,"5 which did not involve the
important issue of the validity of nondeceptive tender offer defenses.
Instead, Schreiber involved a rather insignificant situation in which the
bidder made a hostile partial tender offer but withdrew it, as permitted
by the terms of the offer, when the target and the bidder settled their
differences. The compromise was that the bidder make a new partial
bid benefiting insiders by cutting down on the number of shares pur-
chased from outsiders, including the plaintiff who had accepted the first
bid. The plaintiff, a target shareholder, claimed she was wronged be-
cause if the first bid had been accepted rather than opposed by insiders,
a larger number of her shares would have been accepted. The Supreme
Court found no manipulation, a result with which one could hardly
quarrel." However, the Court based its holding on the broadest possi-
ble ground - that deception or nondisclosure was necessary to a ma-
nipulation. The Court thus confirmed opinions like those of the Second
Circuit in Data Probe and overruled Marathon, but without the bene-
fit of the Data Probe or Marathon records and arguments.
The Court in Schreiber categorically ruled that all manipulations
must involve deception or nondisclosure. This sharply contrasts with its
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 287-89 (1977).
568 F. Supp. at 1551.
" 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
" See Bloomenthal, supra note 33, at 53, 54.
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carefully worded opinion in Santa Fe,"7 which stated that deception
"usually" accompanies manipulation and held that the squeeze-out was
not "manipulative" under rule 10b-5. The Court's categorical ruling in
Schreiber was broad dicta, not only undocumented but contrary to well-
accepted notions that courts should decide only issues presented by the
case.
This overbreadth is merely one item of evidence of the lack of care
that went into this opinion. Further evidence is Schreiber's reference to
Webster's Third New International Dictionary to bolster its decision.
In a stultifying faux pas, the Court quoted a portion of the definition
of "manipulation" as "management with use of unfair, scheming, or
underhanded methods." 8 This to uphold its decision that manipulation
does not include unfairness! The Court also overlooked that Hochfelder
had relied on Webster's second edition, published in 1934, for the defi-
nition of "manipulation" concurrent with the enactment of section
10(b). The second edition's definition was very different from that of
the third, and seemed to require deception. By 1971, Webster's mean-
ing was changed to include nondeceptive artifices, but the Court, in
quoting the new language, apparently failed to read it.69 This error is
cited only to support the charge of inadequate consideration; one might,
of course, engage in pedantic quibbling about the change in meaning
from 1934 (concurrently with the second edition) when section 10(b)
was adopted, to 1968 when section 14(e) was adopted or 1970 when it
was amended (just prior to the third edition). But this definitional
quibbling would simply compound the Court's own error in both
Hochfelder and Schreiber in thus "making a fortress out of the
dictionary. '"70
67 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68 105 S. Ct. at 2462 n.5.
19 See supra note 44.
70 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Learned Hand
pointed out that "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurispru-
dence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always
have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discov-
ery is the surest guide to their meaning." See also Chief Justice Marshall's passage on
the meaning of words in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819):
Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the
mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more com-
mon than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions con-
tain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning
different from that which is obviously intended.
Justice Holmes also iterated the same thought in his magnificent phrase, "a word is
but the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
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In this trilogy of cases the Court also seems to have ignored one of
the basic reasons for the securities acts - to maintain public confidence
in the integrity of the securities markets. Section 2 of the 1934 Act goes
so far as to recite as one of its bases: "to insure maintenance of fair
and honest markets" in securities transactions. This policy alone would
have been a sufficient basis to construe "manipulative" in keeping with
current usage since the adoption of the Williams Act. Yet the Court
failed to address this point.
Another careless error occurs in note 8 of the opinion: the Court
incorrectly describes section 13(e) as imposing "specific disclosure du-
ties."71 Additionally, the Court failed to recognize the anomaly that sec-
tion 14(e), unlike 10b-5, has a separate provision for misrepresenta-
tions and half truths, beyond "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices." Nor did it consider the term "fraudulent," not found
in section 10(b). It similarly failed to acknowledge that section 14(e)
substitutes the terms "acts or practices" for the words "device or contri-
vance," words which the Court heavily relied upon in Hochfelder."
Nor does the logical result of Schreiber, making redundant all the
terms in 14(e) except the word "deceptive," appear to have occurred to
the Court. All in all, the most charitable thing that may be said is that
Schreiber is a sorry opinion, although it is now the law of the land.
Again, it must be added that this Article does not endorse any partic-
ular approach to the serious problem of determining the intent of Con-
gress in 1968 or 1970. The purpose is only to illustrate that the Court,
which in its recent opinions has relied so heavily on the words of the
statute,7 '8 here failed even to consider most of the relevant words. It is
also to show that Congress may reverse the Court's decision, as recom-
mended below, without doing violence to either sound reasoning or
logic.
B. The SEC's Power After Schreiber
Given Schreiber's deception or nondisclosure requirement, section
14(e) does not affect a nondeceptive self-tender even if it discriminates
against a hostile bidder or anyone else. There is no reasonable prophy-
the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 275 U.S. 418,
425 (1917).
71 See supra note 27 (quoting § 13(e)).
" See supra note 29 (quoting § 14(e)).
7" The Court has grown fond of stating that the starting point of statutory interpre-




lactic objective (based on preventing deception) for outlawing fully dis-
closed lollipops. Presumably after Schreiber there also is no longer
room for argument that lob-5 applies to nondeceptive acts in tender
offers even though Santa Fe had not foreclosed this possibility, as noted
above. Nor do other sections of the Williams Act alter this result. Since
section 14(d) does not apply to an issuer's repurchase of its own
shares,74 this leaves only section 13(e), the existing rules thereunder,
and other rules under other rules-enabling provisions as possible bases
for invalidating a nondeceptive lollipop. A review of section 13(e) and
these other provisions shows they provide no basis for outlawing
lollipops.
1. Section 13(e)
Repurchases in tender offers or otherwise, of their own equity secur-
ities by 1934 Act registrants and certain registered closed-end invest-
ment companies are made unlawful by section 13(e) if such repurchases
are "in contravention of such rules as the Commission, in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts
and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B)
to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and
practices."
Since the section is merely a nonself-executing rules enabling act, we
must begin by looking to the SEC's rules to determine whether lolli-
pops are unlawful. These rules show that only rule 13e-4, with its pro-
ration requirement,76 might express a policy that a tender offer for a
class of securities must be made to all holders of the class. Because a
lollipop is by definition a partial tender offer, the proration rule, re-
quiring pro rata acceptance of all shares tendered, arguably may re-
quire acceptance of a pro rata portion of the hostile bidder's shares if
tendered. However, this logic sticks in the craw because the only reason
all lollipops are partial offers is that shares of the hostile bidder are
being excluded. To say that all holders' tenders, including those of the
hostile bidder, are to be accepted pro rata does no less than alter the
issuer's offer, to address it to a different group of holders including the
excluded hostile bidder. The SEC, if it had intended this meaning by
its proration rule, showed an extraordinary regard for economy of
words.
"' Section 14(d) regulates only third party tender offers for 1934 Act registrants,
certain closed-end mutual funds, and insurance companies.
" Rule 13e-4(f(3) requires proration of acceptances when a partial tender offer is
oversubscribed.
19861
University of California, Davis
Further, the proposal releases do not purport to rely on the proration
rule, and for good reason. Even assuming for the moment that a re-
quirement of nondiscriminatory tender offers is the necessary implica-
tion of the proration rule, there is a major difficulty with that interpre-
tation of the rule under section 13(e). The statute makes unlawful only
violations of the Commission's rules, which in turn are limited to (a)
definition of acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative and (b) prescription of means reasonably designed to prevent
such acts and practices - the same limits as in section 14(e), the sub-
ject of Schreiber.
Lower courts certainly should interpret section 13(e)'s language con-
sistently with section 14(e)'s identical language. Hence no nondeceptive
act and no prophylactic rule not reasonably designed to prevent decep-
tion should be held to be within section 13(e)'s enabling provisions.
However, Schreiber's footnote 8 contains enigmatic language that
may undermine the foregoing analysis; this would occur if the lower
courts used this language to alter the aforestated implications of Schrei-
ber concerning the meaning of section 13(e). That note states:
The process through which Congress developed the Williams Act also
suggests a calculated reliance on disclosure, rather than court-imposed
principles of "fairness" or "artificiality," as the preferred method of mar-
ket regulation. For example, as the bill progressed through hearings, both
Houses of Congress became concerned that corporate stock repurchases
could be used to distort the market for control. Congress addressed this
problem with § 13(e), which imposes specific disclosure duties on corpora-
tions purchasing stocks and grants broad regulatory power to the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission to regulate such repurchases. Congress stopped
short, however, of imposing specific substantive requirements forbidding
corporations to trade in their own stock for the purpose of maintaining its
price. The specific regulatory scheme set forth in § 13(e) would be unnec-
essary if Congress at the same time had endowed the term "manipulative"
in § 14(e) with broad substantive significance.
7 6
Obviously, the Court here emphasizes disclosure (although the opin-
ion is wrong in suggesting section 13(e) has any specific disclosure pro-
visions) but it also states that section 13(e) also "grants broad regula-




This language could be taken to extend the Commission's power to
develop prophylactic rules under 13(e) beyond its power under 14(e) on
the ground that the Court failed to equate expressly the prophylactic




provisions of the two sections. The problem of issuer repurchases is
quite different from fraud in tender offers generally, as is obvious from
the historical differences in the implementation of sections 14(e) and
13(e). 7 8 However, given the first sentence of the note, it would seem
that such a construction would pervert the Court's opinion.
It would seem therefore, even assuming that rule 13e-4's proration
requirement is an all holders rule, that it would be difficult, as we have
already found under section 14(e), to find a relationship between an all
holders rule, prohibiting lollipops, and the prevention of deception.
Presumably the Commission's staff was not unaware of these diffi-
culties in the application of section 13(e) because it has failed to suggest
any basis for the proposal beyond what it has described as an implicit
requirement of the Williams Act."' Its release proposing rule 14d-10
merely asserted its all holders position under section 14(d),"0 which has
a statutory proration rule not subject to the Schreiber infirmity requir-
ing deception or a deceptive propensity for proscribing conduct. The
SEC's second release, under section 13(e), which is subject to the
Schreiber infirmity, cross referenced to the section 14(d) release without
pointing out this distinction.
The cross reference to section 14(d) reveals another weakness in the
section 13(e) basis for the all holders rule. This reference to section
14(d) implicitly reasserts the position taken earlier by the Commission,
that any rule under section 14(d), relating to third party offers, may be
promulgated as well under 13(e)."1 The difficulty with this position is
that it is not supported by the text of section 13(e), which reads quite
differently from section 14(d), and under the Supreme Court's clear
direction, as we have noted, the words of the securities statutes are to
8 The differing histories of §§ 14(d)-(f) generally and § 13(e) are evident from the
Commission's all holders releases which, in addition to proposing the all holders fea-
ture, attempt to make the limitations on issuer's tender offers parallel to those on third
party tender offers.
For a description of the SEC's view regarding the differences between issuer and
third party tender offers, see SEC Rel. No. 34-14234 (Dec. 7, 1977) [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,380.
79 SEC Rel. No. 33-6596 (July 1, 1985) [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 83,798.
go SEC Rel. No. 33-6595 (July 1, 1985) [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 83,797.
s SEC Rel. No. 34-16,112 (Aug. 16, 1979) [1978-79 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 82,182, at 82,207; 44 Fed. Reg. 49,406 (1979). Section 13(e) is much
narrower than § 14(e) in one respect. The former regulates only 1934 Act registrants
and certain others while § 14(e) regulates tender offers for any firm, thus only includ-
ing companies having neither registered securities nor reporting under the 1934 Act.
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be given a fairly literal reading. Therefore it seems highly unlikely that
the Commission's power under section 13(e) is coextensive with section
14(d)'s provisions.
2. Section 3(b)
Several other, more general, rules enabling provisions in the 1934
Act pertain to the SEC's power to adopt an all holders rule; three of
these provisions may be quickly disposed of, and the fourth gives only
slight pause.
The first of these, section 3(b),"2 authorizes the Commission to define
terms used in the Act. This would permit a definition of "tender of-
fers." However, even if tender offers were defined to exclude lollipops,
this would not make them unlawful. Alternatively, "manipulations"
conceivably could be redefined as a "technical trade" term based on the
Court's own statements that it is a term of art. However, section 3(b)
requires that definitions be consistent with the purposes of the Act, and
the Court in Schreiber has held the purposes include regulation only of
deception or nondisclosure. Moreover, it would be unseemly now for
the Commission to attempt to overrule the Court. Thus, there is no
other technique for using definition to outlaw lollipops. Indeed, the
Commission has expressly stated that it does not define terms in its
proposals.8 Therefore section 3(b) seems unavailing.
3. Section 9(a)(6)
The second relevant section, 9(a)(6), 84 is equally unavailing. That
provision prohibits pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the price of exchange-
82 Section 3(b) reads:
The Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, as to matters within their respective jurisdictions, shall have
power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade, accounting, and
other terms used in this title, consistently with the provisions and purposes
of this title.
" See supra note 16 (describing Release No. 33-6595).
" Section 9(a)(6) reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a
national securities exchange . . .
(6) To effect either alone or with one or more other persons any series
of transactions for the purchase and/or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabiliz-
ing the price of such security in contravention of such rules and regula-
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traded securities in contravention of SEC rules. But an all holders rule
is not an antiprice-manipulation rule and hence section 9(a)(6) cannot
be a basis for it.
4. Section 15(c)(1)
The third pertinent rules enabling act, section 15(c)(1), 85 reads very
similarly to section 14(e) except that it relates to purchases and sales
and regulates broker-dealer off-exchange "manipulations." However,
section 15(c)(1) could apply to purchases or sales in tender offers since
they usually involve arrangements with broker-dealer agents. But here
too, given Schreiber, "manipulations" presumably must be taken to
mean only deceptive acts as under section 14(e) and section 10(b).
5. Section 23(a)
Possibly a more fruitful section for finding SEC power to adopt an
all holders rule may be section 23(a),86 which authorizes rules "appro-
priate to implement the provisions of this title." Is an all holders rule
for issuer tender offers "appropriate to implement the provisions of [the
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
8' Section 15(c)(1), in pertinent part, reads:
(c)(1) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to
induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other
than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) other-
wise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a member by
means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contri-
vance, and no municipal securities dealer shall make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transac-
tion in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any
municipal security by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for the purposes
of this paragraph, by rules and regulations define such devices or contriv-
ances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
SO Section 23(a) reads in pertinent part:
(1) The Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the other agencies enumerated in section 3(a)(34) of this title
shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be nec-
essary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this title for which
they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by
this title, and may for such purposes classify persons, securities, transac-
tions, statements, applications, reports, and other matters within their re-
spective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, lesser, or different require-
ments for different classes thereof.
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Williams Act]"? Doubtless any advocate could find much fodder in the
word "appropriate" but a court would ordinarily find that it must
mean that rules to implement the purposes of section 13(e) are author-
ized, not that anything deemed appropriate by the Commission is ac-
ceptable.87 Those purposes clearly include the protection of investors
from misrepresentation and nondisclosure as the Court has held, but an
all holders rule has no relation to such wrongs, as we have seen.
Section 13(e) does not seem to have an implicit purpose of protecting
investors by prohibiting discrimination against any of them in issuer
self-tenders. As to bidders, one should recall that in the Chris Craft
case, the Court held that hostile bidders may not claim the rights of
shareholders under section 14(e);88 presumably this would include sec-
tion 13(e).89 However, one may see a distinction between Chris Craft,
in which the hostile bidder was defeated and hence was injured only
qua bidder, and a lollipop, in which the bidder is injured in both ca-
pacities. But this seems unlikely of acceptance.
Is there any implicit purpose in section 13(e) to protect the hostile
bidder qua stockholder or to preserve the freedom of other shareholders
to accept or reject a tender offer? If so, because lollipops may effectively
defeat or discourage bids, they could be outlawed under section 23(a).
Judge Sofaer seems to infer such a purpose in his opinion in the
Data Probe case, 90 based on his analysis of Edgar v. MITE Corp.9' As
noted, however, he was reversed by the Second Circuit. Was he never-
theless correct? His position is attractive because it would fully imple-
ment the widely held view that target managements should be limited
to taking measures to encourage an auction of the shares.9 The legisla-
87 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-23 (1819), so
construing the "Necessary and Proper" clause of the Constitution even though it was a
"Constitution which [the Court was] construing" there, which makes McCulloch an a
fortiori case. The Court has been faithful to this view ever since in construing statutes
like § 23(a) of the 1934 Act. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S.
356, 369 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969); see also
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 1979) (rule 2(e) valid under §
25(a) of the 1934 Act).
8 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
s9 See, e.g., Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co. [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 92,238 (3d Cir. 1985).
90 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
9- 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
92 For an excellent review of the different views of academics, including the one here
referred to, see Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical As-




tive history may not negate this result because in 1968 when the Wil-
liams Act was adopted, it was generally believed that there was always
room for a contest between bidders and target management, thus per-
mitting auctions. Now that targets have developed nearly invulnerable
defenses such as lollipops against two-tier hostile bids, it could be that
the courts should find, as did Judge Sofaer, that such invulnerable de-
fenses were not intended by Congress to be permitted.
The major difficulty with this reasoning is its dependence on the log-
ical fallacy that since Congress did not anticipate invulnerable target
defenses and two-tier front-end loaded bids, it would have outlawed the
defenses had it considered them. The logic fails for the obvious reason
that Congress might just as plausibly have chosen the alternative path
of not outlawing them. Certainly there is currently substantial political
support for both views. If Congress had consciously considered both,
there is no telling how it would have decided.
Nor can it be argued persuasively that Congress has established the
policy of encouraging auctions. Congress at most seems to have devel-
oped a policy of preserving the relative positions of targets and bidders
under federal and state laws, that is, without itself favoring either, or
permitting the states to alter the balance of power.9" Since the target
company defenses devised by imaginative target advisors were available
from the beginning and are not the result of new state legislation, the
power of these defenses was always held by targets and the balance
may not now be altered by federal courts.
II. SHOULD CONGRESS ADOPT A NATIONAL POLICY TO
REGULATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES?
Congress is understandably puzzled as to what policy, if any, it
should adopt with respect to tender offer defenses. There is pressure to
increase target management's power to fend off takeovers as well as
pressure to limit that power. The result has been, as with Nero, inac-
tion while the problems mounted. In addition, under our federal sys-
tem, Congress' inaction does result in a policy - the policy of abdica-
tion of power to the states to control these questions. For the reasons
discussed below, it is imperative that Congress take affirmative steps to
increase both Congress' role and the role of the SEC in regulating take-
over defenses.
The policy of encouraging auctions seems also to be the fundamental basis for the
recent Delaware and New York decisions outlawing the lockups granted under the
circumstances of the cases. See supra note 19 (discussing Hanson Trust and Revlon).
9' See Judge Winter's opinion in Data Probe, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
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A. State Law Bias Toward Incumbents
Perhaps the most important consideration is that the law of the state
of incorporation governs fiduciary duties of directors and managers in
tender offer disputes. This and the further facts that directors and man-
agers control the selection of the state of incorporation and that state
revenues and legal fees are enhanced by local incorporations, lead to the
result that state courts and legislatures vie with each other to provide
ever more hospitable climates for managers and directors. This is, al-
though oversimplified here, the well-documented "race of laxity""4 that
has resulted in Delaware's leading the way in most states' efforts to
maximize managements' comforts. The consequence, in the tender offer
context, is that state legislation may be expected to favor incumbent
managements. Clearly, if desirable public policy conceivably may in-
clude encouragement of tender offers, the bias described may prevent a
fair consideration of whether this policy is desirable. Bluntly put, the
Delaware legislature and courts cannot be expected to be fair in consid-
ering competing policies to serve the national public interest.
B. Economic Analysis, the Market for Capital, and the Market
for Control
Perhaps surprisingly, conventional economic analysis also calls for
federal law to govern tender offer defenses. That analysis shows that it
is not irrational to make certain nondeceptive tender offer defenses in-
valid under federal law, overruling Schreiber, while at the same time
requiring deception or nondisclosure in order to establish violations
under rule 10b-5 as in Santa Fe.
As is manifest, the congressional action recommended in this Article
would make tender offer defenses a matter of federal law while leaving
other alleged breaches of fiduciary duties a matter for the chartering
state as under Santa Fe. It may be argued persuasively that this is
precisely the correct result based on an economic analysis. Thus, the
argument of then Professor Winter, later the author of the Data Probe
Second Circuit opinion, was that federal chartering of corporations, or
establishment of federal fiduciary standards generally, would be unwise
for economic reasons.95 But in that same article, Judge Winter pointed
out that the economic basis for continuing state chartering and regula-
tion of fiduciary duties in general - to preserve competition in the
" Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For fur-
ther explication, see authorities cited supra note 12.
"4 Winter, supra note 63.
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capital markets thereby enhancing efficiency - has little to do with the
market for corporate control. For this reason, he called for elimination
of state takeover statutes.
This seems correct. In parallel with Winter's conclusion, the logic
also dictates that state fiduciary law should not regulate takeovers.96
Perhaps stated overly simply, that logic is:
(a) if corporate managers know what is good for them, that is, if they
wish to remain in office by avoiding a takeover, they will incorporate in
states that will enhance shareholder values, and since they have had
free choice of the locus of their corporate charter for decades, they must
be choosing the states that do so enhance values; hence there is no eco-
nomic reason to change the current status of state law chartering or
fiduciary duties to one of federal chartering or federal fiduciary duties;
(b) however, takeover defenses, if powerful enough, will work di-
rectly contrary to the policy of continued state chartering; the funda-
mental economic reason Judge Winter asserts for state chartering - to
encourage management to enhance shareholder values in order to avoid
takeovers - is destroyed when the chartering state's laws enable man-
agers to avoid takeovers by other means, such as lollipops, lockups, or
poison pills.
Thus, even those who argue against federalization of corporate fidu-
ciary law generally on economic terms, are led by the same logic to the
result that tender offer defenses should be subject to federal, not state
law, limitations.
C. Need for Legislation Rather Than Adjudication: Edgar v.
MITE Corp.
Another reason for federal legislation is that tender offer policy is
largely a political-economic question: what interests should be served
by the law? These questions are for legislatures, not the judiciary. Yet
under Edgar v. MITE Corp.9" the Supreme Court has made clear that
state legislatures are hobbled seriously in taking the steps they may feel
" Judge Winter's article went on to suggest that state takeover statutes should not
be upheld on the economic grounds he suggests for upholding continued state chartering
and state regulation of fiduciary duties. But he did not-address the subject of state
common law takeover defenses and it is not clear that he would agree with this Article's
conclusion. Among other reasons, he addressed the first generation takeover statutes
which applied to foreign corporations as well as domestic. But the common law take-
over defenses are tied only to the state's domestic corporations since the law of the state
of incorporation governs fiduciary duties. Id.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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desirable in implementing any particular policy. MITE concluded that
aggressive state tender offer legislation violates the Commerce Clause
because this legislation unduly burdens interstate commerce. 8 Thus,
the people's representatives may not act. Instead, virtually all regula-
tion of defenses is for state common law, administered by state or fed-
eral courts (the latter exercising pendent or diversity jurisdiction). Even
if state judges are politically responsive when elected to office, this type
of responsiveness is not of the same quality as that of a large, represen-
tative legislative body. Also, courts do not have access to the legislative
tools useful for fashioning comprehensive rules to regulate tender offers
such as waiting periods, limitations, establishment of arbitration panels,
or the like. Thus, the constitutional strictures of MITE cry for legisla-
tive action by Congress as opposed to state legislative or judicial
regulation.
D. Uncertainty of State Law Administered by Federal Courts or
Courts of Other States
Our federal system gives another reason for rejecting the approach of
Schreiber and prohibiting a broad range of manipulative devices. The
continued application of state law regulation of tender offer defenses to
a national problem assures uncertainty. Necessarily, even if each state
ultimately developed a clear-cut rule of law, the federal system would
result in varying applications of that law, with no single court vested
with jurisdiction to coordinate the varying views - an undesirable sta-
tus for a system of law.
Thus, in many cases a federal court will be required to apply state
law because of pendent jurisdiction. Once federal jurisdiction attaches,
not even the highest court of the state will have a part in the matter,
thereby leaving the federal courts to their own devices. A recent illus-
tration is the Hanson Trust case" in which a majority of panel mem-
bers of the federal Court of Appeals applied the New York business
judgment rule in a novel manner, although the decision was fully dis-
credited in the dissent. The majority imposed an "enhanced" duty of
care on independent directors who, in the face of a hostile tender offer,
granted a lockup option in a leveraged buyout in which management
would participate. Although some would disagree, it appears that the
majority, rather than deferring to the directors' business judgment, in
98 Id.
" See Hanson Trust PLC v. SMC Corp. [Current Vol.) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)




fact determined subjectively that the deal was not a good one. The dis-
sent argues compellingly that the New York courts would not have so
held. In any event, regardless of whether this was so in Hanson Trust,
it is a likely probability in many cases.' 00 Other states' courts will also
frequently entertain suits involving takeover of foreign state's corpora-
tions with no appeal to the foreign state's courts.
E. Resolution of Issues Instead of Continuing Experimentation
The fact that Congress has not yet developed a policy governing
tender offer defenses is no basis for abdicating responsibility to the
states. Admittedly, use of the fifty states as the exclusive laboratories for
continued experimentation with tender offer regulation would be rea-
sonable in some circumstances. But this experimentation has already
taken place for nearly twenty years and much has been learned. More-
over, the subject is a rapidly evolving one that does not permit leisurely
progress. In addition, the suggestion that the national government es-
tablish a federal policy does not require discontinuance of state experi-
mentation. As MITE makes clear, the federal securities laws do not
occupy the field of tender offers so as to preempt all state law. There-
fore, the states, at least by common law, may continue to act until an
appropriate federal rule or regulation preempts the state law.
F. The SEC as an Additional (and Better) Experimentor
Moreover, the SEC is a better repository than the states for at least
some of the power that Congress does not exercise. In .other portions of
the securities laws, such as some of the antifraud provisions and proxy
regulations, when Congress knew it wanted a federal answer to the
federal problem, but had not yet itself developed an answer, it dele-
gated rulemaking power to the SEC. This time-honored method is
equally available here - as is suggested below in part III - if Con-
100 Another illustration of federal courts misconstruing state law, well known to se-
curities lawyers, occurred in the insider trading context some years ago when the Sec-
ond Circuit decided in Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), that the Florida
law relating to insider trading was in accord with an unusual New York case, Dia-
mond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 78 (1969). Al-
though Florida had a referral statute permitting federal courts to refer questions of
Florida law to the Florida courts for an advisory opinion, the Second Circuit at first
failed to take advantage of it. However, the Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
reference. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). Thereupon the Florida Su-
preme Court corrected the Second Circuit panel's misconception of Florida law. Schein
v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
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gress agrees that tender offer defenses should be regulated by federal,
not state, law.
G. Hearing All Views
In addition, a federal policy would ensure that all interests are
heard. The federal government provides a national forum on which all
interest groups can focus their attention. Additionally, the influence of
most interests on Delaware law is nil. Therefore, federal action would
allow all views to be heard.
H. A National Market for Control
There are still more reasons for a national policy concerning tender
offer defenses. The value of the securities of all publicly traded compa-
nies in the United States is approximately 2.5 trillion dollars, or
twenty-two percent of the total assets of the nation.' That the market
for control of these companies is a national market is not open to ques-
tion. Thus, national control seems appropriate.
L A National Credit Market
A major part of this market for control includes the credit markets of
the nation. Cash offers, which are the typical form for hostile bids,
require large sums often financed by bank credit, arbitrageurs, and
purchasers of "junk bonds." According to the Economic Report of the
President transmitted to the Congress in February, 1985:
Although the number of transactions remains below previous peaks, the
total value of merger and acquisition transactions has recently reached
new highs. The announced value of merger and acquisition transactions
reported in the first 9 months of 1984 was $103 billion. (Ed.'s Note: This
activity reached $124 billion (nominal) by the year end, an increase of
about 11 percent over the previous peak recorded in 1968 when the major
form of consideration was corporate paper.) Indeed, the average annual
reported real value of mergers and acquisitions during 1981-84 is approxi-
mately 48 percent greater than the average reported during any 4 years of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, fewer transactions have been gener-
ating a relatively larger dollar volume of merger and acquisition activ-
ity. . . .The large dollar volume of recent merger and acquisition activity
is attributable primarily to a substantial increase in the size of the largest
individual transactions, most of which involve publicly traded corpora-
tions. Of the 100 largest merger and acquisition transactions recorded
through year-end 1983, measured in nominal terms, 65 occurred between




1981 and 1983, 24 occurred between 1979 and 1981, and only 11 occurred
prior to 1979. Prior to 1976 the largest acquisition on record, measured in
constant 1983 dollars, had a value of $3.3 billion. Today, the record stands
at $13.3 billion. Indeed, transactions with a nominal value in excess of $1
billion used to be rare and only 12 such transactions were recorded in the
12-year span from 1969 to 1980. However, between 1981 and 1984 alone,
there have been at least 45 such transactions.02
In 1985, twenty-four takeover transactions involved sums exceeding $1
billion.03 The impact on the nation's credit markets from these de-
mands is clearly a matter of national interest, far beyond the province
of the states.
As a result of borrowings to finance these takeovers, ratios of long-
term debt to equity (an important measure of risk) are increasing dra-
matically. The average debt-equity ratio (based on market, not book
values) is now 71.4 percent 04 as compared to 35.3 percent in 1961 and
46.7 percent in 1971.'05 Given the magnitude of many recent acquisi-
tions and the large aggregate size of takeovers, there is a great public
interest in the continuing viability of these businesses. The recent
bailouts of Chrysler, Lockheed, and the Continental Bank remind us
that the ultimate risk bearers of large public corporations may well be
the federal government. It is clear also that no state, and certainly not
Delaware, is able to aid a failing mega-corporation. At the very least,
this increased accumulation of debt has a striking effect on the credi-
tors, suppliers, employees, and customers of these companies. An obvi-
ous example is the sale of the acquired companies' assets and subse-
quent laying off of its employees as necessary to meet the debt created
by the acquisition itself. In other words, the interest involved goes be-
yond that of the shareholder and is certainly national in its scope and
effect.
Recently, the Federal Reserve Board has recognized this national in-
terest and brought certain aspects of tender offer financings, specifically
the use of junk bonds issued by shell corporations, under its margin
regulations. The reactions by numerous federal agencies toward the
Board's action further evidences the national character of the interests
102 Id.
'03 Reed, A Time for Reflection and a Time to Look Ahead, 20 MERGERS & Ac-
QUISITIONS 46 (1986). W.T. Grimm & Co. also publishes data annually and because
varying criteria are used, slightly different results accrue. W.T. Grimm & Co. con-
cludes that 26 deals worth at least $1 billion each were closed in 1985.
"o See N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, at F1, col. 3.
108 Id.
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J. Shareholders' Federal Proxy Rights
Another reason for federal rather than state regulation lies in the
need to vindicate a long standing federal policy of shareholder protec-
tion found in the proxy rules. A fundamental change in the nature of
corporate governance is taking place because of various takeover de-
fenses in contravention of the policy of shareholder democracy estab-
lished by the proxy regulations. Although that policy has largely failed,
it remains vital in some ways; for example, proxy contests are the sole
alternative to tender offers for removing unwanted management or al-
tering corporate policies. However, the basic thrust of many of the cur-
rently used defenses against takeovers is to take away the little power
held by shareholders through their voting rights.
The problem was articulated, although denied, in Part VI of Vice-
Chancellor Walsh's opinion in Moran v. Household International,°"
addressing a poison pill plan. The elements of the poison pill in that
case included a program that granted existing stockholders of the poten-
tial target the right to purchase either the target's own shares or any
successful bidder's shares at a bargain price. The effect was to dilute
the bidder's proportional share after a takeover. The rights were trig-
gered either when a certain percentage of the target's shares were ac-
quired or a certain percentage of proxies to vote its shares were ac-
quired. This latter feature deviates from the normal proxy contest
characteristics. The two triggering events together diminish unhappy
shareholders' powers to sell in a tender offer or grant proxies to insur-
gents in a proxy contest. The small shareholders' only remaining escape
is the so-called "Wall Street rule" of "love it or leave it": they can sell
their shares on the market, at a deflated price that reflects the fact that
buyers will have the same diminished rights. The Vice-Chancellor held
this diminution of shareholders' rights to be permissible if its purpose is
not to entrench management's control further but is, in the business
judgment of management, to protect the corporation, including its vari-
ous nonshareholder constituents.
Once defenses such as the poison pill are established, virtually no
power will exist in shareholders of public companies to prevent man-
agements from having exclusive power over retention or sale of control.
106 FRB Reg. § 207.112 (Jan. 8, 1986). See the report of the FRB action adopting
the interpretation, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
1 n 490 A.2d at 1346, 1359, 1379 (Del. 1985).
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Thus an important check on management power will be lost, contrary
to longstanding national policy. Indeed, one may protest that this is not
shareholder democracy; it is noblesse oblige at best, corporate fascism at
worst. 08
K. The Unimportance of the Tradition of State Law
On the other side of the argument - favoring the status quo of state
law regulation - is the traditional view that corporate law is for the
states. However, this traditional view is anachronistic in the takeover
game, as shown above. Perhaps 150 years ago when even the largest
public corporations were truly local businesses, both economically and
legally,' 09 there was validity to placing power in the states. That is no
longer true. Indeed, many of the business corporations of the type here
being discussed are now multinational. In addition, tender offer de-
fenses are in a different category from the concepts of preemptive rights
and dividend regulation, which may be appropriate subjects for local
control. This is illustrated by the fact that proxy regulation and most
aspects of tender offer regulation are acknowledged as national, not lo-
cal concerns. Tender offer defenses are not concerned with operation of
the corporation but are concerned, as demonstrated above, with the
market for the control of the corporations.
A fuller documentation of these essayed arguments in support of a
national policy to regulate tender offers would belabor the obvious. It
seems that the emotional appeal of allowing state law to regulate corpo-
rate activity, even if valid for corporate internal affairs, has no place in
the regulation of the market for control of public corporations and the
credit markets of the nation.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Once it is determined that Congress should adopt some policy to reg-
ulate tender offer defenses, the next question is, what should that policy
be? Here we meet the cause of prior inaction - the absence of a con-
sensus. Some commentators believe that target managements should be
prohibited altogether from making any defenses, while others believe
that they should be allowed to raise only defenses that would compel an
1'3 Reed, supra note 103, at 48.
'09 See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 548-56 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (describing charters of the 19th century limiting companies' capital, geographic
bounds, and purposes).
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auction."' Others believe that corporate managers must serve not only
their shareholder constituency but also employees, suppliers, consumers
of the company's product, communities where company plants are lo-
cated, or others, therefore requiring a business judgment rule. Still
others are more concerned with bigness as badness than with any other
aspect of the problem. All these views have degrees of legitimacy and
force. Since these views point in varying directions, and since no con-
sensus has developed on any one of them, it is clear that it is probably
wise to allow the now fifty state "laboratories" to continue to experi-
ment with various laws affecting tender offers. However, some aspects
of tender offer defense law are already the subject of general consensus
based on neutral principles. I believe that the illegitimacy of the Unocal
type discriminatory self-tender is one of these.
To accommodate all these considerations is a surprisingly simple
matter - and one that probably was within the original intent of Con-
gress when it adopted the Williams Act in 1968. That is to include in
the concept of "manipulative" transactions whatever cunning devices
the SEC, by rule, establishes, including those not resting on misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure - such as the fully disclosed, discriminatory
self-tender offer.
To implement this objective, section 14(e) could be amended to add a
sentence at its end. It would then read as follows (the proposed amend-
ment is in italics):
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection by rules and regula-
tions define, and prescribe means reasonable designed to prevent such acts
and practices as are fraudulent deceptive, or manipulative. For purposes
of the preceding sentence of this section only, the term "manipulative" is
not limited to acts or practices based in misrepresentations or non-
disclosures.
Alternatively, borrowing a leaf from the preliminary version of sec-
tion 10(b) previously described11. instead of adding a new sentence, the
last sentence of existing section 14(e) could be amended to read: The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection only, prohibit or
110 See Coffee, supra note 92, at 1146-61 (describing the different views).
"1 See supra text accompanying note 41.
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regulate the use of any act or practice which it finds detrimental to the
public interest or to the proper protection of investors.
Either amendment would serve several valuable functions:
(a) State law would continue to apply, until and unless the SEC
adopted a contrary rule;
(b) A national lawmaking forum would exist, in full public view and
subject to the normal political processes, and taking into account na-
tional interests, allowing thorough consideration of poison pills, lock-
ups, superstock, and the like;
(c) Flexibility would exist because there would be no need to invoke
the cumbersome Congressional legislative process to enact new rules or
amend or repeal old ones;
(d) Procedural due process provided by current rulemaking processes
under the Administrative Procedure Act""2 would assure an airing of
all views;
(e) Congressional oversight would exist to check overzealousness on
the part of the SEC;
(f) Current prophylactic rules of the Commission, such as Rule 14e-
I requiring tender offers to remain open 20 days, would be validated;
and
(g) The law of rule lOb-5 would continue as is.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts and the SEC are presently incapable of regulating
tender offer defenses in any meaningful way. This is a direct result of
the Supreme Court's holding in Schreiber that section 14(e) of the Wil-
liams Act applies only to manipulative devices that involve deception or
nondisclosure. Popular tender offer defenses, including the powerful
"lollipop" defense, poison pills, lock-ups, and superstock do not rely on
deception or nondisclosure. Since other federal law is inapplicable, pre-
sent federal law does not regulate defenses. The economic magnitude of
takeovers and attempted takeovers, and their utility in legitimizing con-
tinued state chartering and regulating of fiduciary duties, necessarily
implicate national interests. Therefore, the time has come for congres-
sional action to bring takeover defenses within the zone of federal
regulation.
12 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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